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Theorizing media production: the 
poverty of political economy  
 
 
The problem of theorizing media production 
 
In their seminal essay calling for a political economy of communications (PEC), 
Murdock and Golding (1973:205) argued: ‘the obvious starting point for a political 
economy of mass communications is the recognition that the mass media are first and 
foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce and distribute 
commodities’. In the second issue of Media Culture and Society Garnham (1979:139) 
argued that ‘to examine the specifically capitalist mode of media production we need 
to see the ways in which capital uses the real process of media production in order to 
increase its value, in order to grow’. 
 
     Yet in a comprehensive review of the field, four decades later, Garnham (2011:51) 
concluded that PEC has had ‘a tendency to regard the system of production as a black 
box’, Mosco (2011:359) suggested that the field ‘has tended to situate its object 
within the sphere of consumption and this has contributed to a focus on the 
relationship of audiences to texts more than on the media labor process’.  Mosco 
(2011: 360) is also critical of accounts of media production which emphasize its 
creative rather than its industrial character: ‘the emphasis on creativity only obscures 
a complex process of production, one that, however unevenly, has come to look more 
like a labor process in the general economy’.    
 
     In the absence of a theory of media production, academic study has been 
significantly influenced by labour process analysis. Thus, Caldwell’s (2008:156) 
study of film and TV production in contemporary Hollywood cites a key contrast:  
‘whereas the rationalized Taylorist efficiencies of the classic studio or network 
assembly line safeguarded profits, the new world of contract production sought profits 
through greater forms of corporate ‘flexibility’’. A recent British collection theorizing 
cultural work notes, ‘the story of declining union representation in the cultural 
industries as they reconstructed themselves along post-Fordist lines’ (Oakley, 2013: 
61).  
 
     This theory of a historic transition in modes of media production, owes most to a 
series of articles by Storper and Christopherson (1986, 1987, 1989 and Storper, 1989, 
1993) whose study of film production in Hollywood identified a period of mass 
production followed by a transformation to flexible specialization. Storper and 
Christopherson’s theory of two production paradigms has been broadly influential in 
accounts of other media industries including UK television (Saundry and Nolan, 
1998, Starkey, et al., 2000), magazines (Ekynsmith, 1998), newsrooms (Cottle, 2007), 
games (Champion, 2013) and the creative industries in general (Caves, 2000, Lash 
and Urry 1994, Davies and Sigthorsson 2013). Detailed observational studies of TV 
productions have also found evidence to support the mass production thesis: ‘soap 
opera is the genre most suited to routinised production with workers performing 
limited repetitive tasks (Paterson 1981: 58). Brennan (2004:9) describes the RTE soap 
opera as a ‘standardised product’ with a production process, ‘resembling many of the 
productive aspects of Fordism’. Critics of the theory (see Aksoy and Robins, 1992 
and Wasko, 1994, Hesmondhalgh, 1996) objected to Storper and Christopherson’s 
argument that flexible specialisation weakened the majors’ oligopolistic control, but 
did not significantly challenge their underlying theory of production.  In studying UK 
film, Blair and Rainnie (2000:189) accepted that ‘in the 1920s scripts were produced 
by journeyman writers, cut and pasted on predictable and interchangeable lots using a 
semi or unskilled workforce’ (Blair and Rainnie: 189) 
 
     The influence of Storper and Christopherson’s study of Hollywood has contributed 
to a situation where Hollywood film production has become paradigmatic of media 
production in much the same way as Ford was for manufacturing (see Aglietta 1979). 
DeFillipi et al. (2007:513) recently noted that ‘Hollywood is not only a major hub of 
movie production; it is also a production model’. If Hollywood is paradigmatic of 
media production, then any theory must correctly analyse this production model. In 
this article I try to do this by returning to Storper and Christopherson’s analysis of 
Hollywood film production and also to the much more detailed analysis by Staiger 
(1985), and comparing their analysis of mass production in Hollywood with the 
classic case of Ford Motors. Next, Storper and Christopherson’s thesis of transition to 
flexible specialization in production is tested against the Hollywood case. Having 
argued that the mass production/flexible specialization thesis is flawed, I briefly 
examine an alternative, that media production is characterized by a pre-industrial, 
craft paradigm. The next step is to examine whether organization theory and media 
economics may provide a better foundation for theory, and test this against the 
Hollywood case. This draws into question the extent to which Hollywood is genuinely 
paradigmatic of media production. An alternative is to think of media production 
processes as responses both to common economic and organizational challenges and 
to media-specific creative and cultural influences. A full statement of this theoretical 
approach is the subject of a future article, however a brief attempt is made to show the 
relationships between market and organizational variables and media-specific aspects 
of production 
 
Mass production in Hollywood and Michigan 
 
To state Storper and Christopherson’s argument baldly, we are asked to accept that 
film production in Hollywood’s ‘studio system’ was organized in the same way as 
mass production in manufacturing (the same ‘mode of production’).  Although 
Storper and Christopherson do not significantly reference her work, the first, and most 
detailed attempt to make this case is Staiger’s (1985) contribution to Bordwell et al.’s 
(1985) The Classic Hollywood Cinema (CHC). CHC is a major work of historical 
scholarship, hugely influential in the study of film style and as I shall try to show in 
the concluding section, CHC’s attempt to sketch the relationship between film styles 
and production systems remains a fruitful starting place for a theory of media 
production.  My criticisms concern the theoretical analysis (rather than the historical 
accuracy) of CHC’s account of the development of film production.  
 
     The only attempt I am aware of, to test the theory of film mass production by 
comparing Hollywood with Ford, is Dawson (2013). His account, although helpful, 
comprises only a few paragraphs and discusses neither Staiger’s (1985) detailed 
account nor empirical accounts of mass production  (at Ford or elsewhere) and so 
cannot be considered a fair test.  Here, I attempt a systematic comparison, the primary 
sources for which will be Staiger, Storper and Christopherson and Hounshell’s (1984) 
classic account of Ford’s development of the mass production system.  
 
     For her theory of film production, Staiger adopts Braverman’s (1974:51) critique 
of ‘Taylorism’. Taylor (1914) believed the key to Scientific Management was 
separation of the conception and execution of production work – so managers could 
design the most efficient tasks. Braverman argued that Taylorism ignored the moral 
distinction between social and detailed division of labour: ‘ between the practice of 
farming, cabinetmaking, or blacksmithing, and the repeated tightening of a single set 
of bolts hundreds of times each day.’ While the former ‘may enhance the individual 
and the species’, Braverman argued that the latter  ‘renders the worker inadequate to 
carry through any complete production process…(and is) is a crime against the person 
and against humanity’ (ibid).  
 
     Staiger (1985) argues that the studios instituted Taylor’s separation of conception 
and execution in film production such that an ‘artisanal mode of production’, where 
‘the cameraman for all intents and purposes created the entire product on his own’ 
(1985:231), was broken down into a detailed division of labour. Storper and 
Christopherson’s analysis of production is fundamentally similar: ‘it began as a craft 
but, with the creation of a large, assured market, the product was standardised and the 
production process rationalised’ (Storper, 1989:277). 
 
     The strongest element of this theory of ‘mass production’ in Hollywood is the 
vertical integration of production processes on one ‘factory’ site. Staiger (1985:92) 
and Storper (1989: 276) both make the point that the studios explicitly used Henry 
Ford as their role model. The construction of large studios facilitated a ‘factory’ 
system which ‘allowed an ease in controlling labor time, eliminating irregularity of 
production, and permitting detailed division of labor as well as reducing material and 
labor cost’ (Staiger, 1985:207). By co-locating key processes, factories both enable 
closer supervision and discipline, ensuring worker effort is maintained, and also 
clarify process dependencies, reducing delays and wastage. Staiger shows that the 
studios were keen to promote their facilities as factories. A description of the studios 
of Twentieth Century Fox in 1919 read: 
 
‘‘It has been laid out along scientific lines by authorities on factory and office 
construction, with a view to speed, economy, and concentration in every possible 
phase of efficient motion-picture production, from the filming to bookkeeping to 
stenography to starring’’ (Scientific American cited in Staiger, 1985:213) 
 
     However, factories do not necessitate a separation of conception and execution, 
and complex tasks may remain under the control of craft workers. The purpose of 
Fordism was to move from factories, which enable manufacture, to mass production. 
Hounshell (1984:220) shows that it was not the construction of Ford’s Highland Park 
factory, but the revolution inside which transformed production: ‘Until about two 
years before the introduction of the Model T the factory of the Ford Motor Company 
resembled more closely a poorly equipped job shop than a well-planned 
manufacturing establishment’. 
 
     Staiger and Storper both identify a central role for the continuity script (‘a paper 
record to coordinate the assembly of the product’, Staiger 1985: 215) in Taylorising 
film production. For Storper (1989:278) the continuity script facilitated ‘a 
management-orientated model that strictly separated conception from execution’. 
Staiger  (1985:228) argues that; ‘the continuities included meticulous technical 
instructions such as special effects and tinting directions and notes to the 
cutters…once the story was divided into shots… the filmmakers could tick off the 
shots one by one as they were completed’. This labour process theory of the 
continuity script as a design blueprint is now central to accounts of the history of 
screenwriting (Maras, 2009) and the geographic clustering of Hollywood (Scott, 
2005). 
 
     Dawson (2013:29) challenges this argument: ‘mass production industries, such as 
the automobile industry, have no need to issue such elaborate instructions, as the 
assembly line or belt provides physical control and determines the pace and order of 
work’. However this view unduly minimizes the role of manufacturing blueprints. 
The difference between film and car production is that while each continuity script 
could be used to plan production of a single film, Ford’s single blueprint was used to 
plan production of millions of cars. So crucial was the model T blueprint that he 
would allow no changes: ‘Ford… seemed to worship his original product design and 
his chief engineer stated ‘in all the years with the Model T no one worried or bothered 
Mr Ford with design changes’’ (cited in Best, 1997:11).  
 
     Staiger, Storper and Christopherson argue that the rationalising effect of the 
continuity script depended on standardisation of the film product as the fiction feature 
film. CHC (1985:99) analyses 100 films of the period and identifies ‘repetition of 
characteristics considered desirable in the film’. Storper (1989:277) describes 
standardised, ‘formulaic’ films (‘the formula picture’) which were ‘sold by the foot 
rather than on the basis of content’. Staiger also shows that rise of the ‘factory’ was 
accompanied by a narrowing of the product range, from non-fiction scenics and 
topicals to fictional narrative films. She (1985:112) argues that standardisation of the 
Hollywood film was ‘a move to uniformity to allow mass production’.  
 
     Comparing this account of standardisation in Hollywood with standardisation at 
Ford reveals that the same word is being used to mean qualitatively different things. 
Staiger (1985:98) argues that standardisation also allowed flexibility: ‘just as the 
specifications for a machine allow a degree of tolerance for individual parts, so too we 
might think of the standardised film’. Similarly while the focus was on producing 
feature films, she also notes that studios: ‘also planned various shorts, comedies, 
serials, and newsreels’ (1985:233). Although Dawson (2013:29) disputes Storper’s 
description of standardised products, he advances no evidence to support this view: 
‘for all the sameness of Hollywood products in the 1930s, feature films were 
sufficiently differentiated by studio style, genre and cast to convince audiences of 
their individuality’.  
 
     By contrast Hounshell, (1984:233) shows how ‘Ford's determination to produce 
only the Model T provided his engineers the perfect opportunity to install single-
purpose machine tools’ which could produce large volumes of standardised, 
interchangeable parts. ‘Every critical part of the Model T was machined in standard 
fixtures and checked by standard gauges both during and after the operation 
sequence’ (1984: 229). Ford had a product range of one. Standardisation meant 
producing vast numbers of identical products. Ford’s engineers made product 
standardisation measurable and permitted no tolerance or margin of variation. At Ford 
standardisation meant absolute and measurably uniform parts and products, while 
Staiger, Storper and Christopherson use the term to describe subjective, stylistic 
similarities among unique products. 
 
     The mass production theory suggests that the combined effect of continuity scripts 
and product standardisation was to achieve a detailed division of labour and routinize 
tasks: ‘a similar blueprint confronted the workers time after time, making its use 
routine and fast’ (1985: 236).  Film production was Taylorized so that workers were 
‘completing relatively repetitive, predictable tasks’ for example ‘make-up artists had a 
standard tool kit of techniques that they applied repeatedly’ (Storper and 
Christopherson, 1989: 340). Similarly Staiger argues ‘sets could be lit basically the 
same way for illumination of the action no matter what happened in the narrative or 
who was playing the lead’ (1985: 211). Finally, work could be planned sequentially, 
completing the comparison with Ford: ‘a product would move from department to 
department in assembly line fashion’ (Storper, 1989:278) The result, Staiger 
(1985:244) argues, was the transformation of the work of the artisanal filmmaker until 
a: ‘detailed division of labor facilitated mass production.’  Storper (1989:276) states 
that ‘contrary to its glamorous and artisanal image, large firms once manufactured 
motion pictures via a production process organized along mass production principles’.  
 
     But did filmmaking involve dehumanising, routinized, detailed labour? Describing 
the emergence of specialist occupations, Staiger (1985:212) notes that ‘it was not 
uncommon for a person to hold several (of these roles) simultaneously or 
successively’ and director and cameraman were interdependent and collaborative 
roles rather than rigidly prescribed and routinized. Storper and Christopherson 
(1989:333) show that ‘crafts were handed down, father-to-son, and apprenticeships 
represented admission to a social world as well as preparation for a livelihood.’ 
 
     The revolution at Ford bears much closer similarities to Braverman’s thesis. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, like other car manufacturers, Ford was reliant on skilled 
workers: ‘what tools the company possessed were general machines, operated by 
hard-to-find skilled machinists’ (Hounshell 1984:220). As Wilson and McKinlay 
(2010:761) note, this form of production ‘left the choice of technique, task sequencing 
and pace in the hands of skilled artisans, anathema to the new engineering logic’.  
One of Ford’s senior engineers recalled the importance of transforming this work 
organization: ‘‘to create great quantity of production… to accomplish the rapid 
assembly of units. There can't be much hand work or fitting’ (cited in Hounshell, 
1984:221).  
 
     Hounshell shows how Ford’s engineers used planning, control and specific 
technical choices to replace the skills and control of craft workers with management 
control and unskilled, detailed labour: ‘the Ford tool experts designed almost all of 
the fixtures and gauges so that they could be used by unskilled machine tenders’ (op. 
cit. 230). Henry Ford rejoiced in this complete separation of conception and 
execution. ‘The net result’ he announced ‘is the reduction of the necessity for thought 
on the part of the worker and the reduction of his movements to a minimum. He does 
as nearly as possible, only one thing with only one movement’ (cited in Chinoy, 
1982:87).  It is here that we find a detailed division of labour which meets Marx’s 
(1976:458) definition: ‘the worker's continued repetition of the same narrowly defined 
act’.  
 
     Staiger, Caves, and Storper all contend that Hollywood used ‘assembly line’ 
techniques. But again the term is being used to describe qualitatively different 
processes. Ford’s assembly line controlled the intensity and especially the regularity 
of work, enabling the coordination of thousands of workers in producing hundreds of 
thousands of cars (Hounshell, 1984: 237). In Hollywood, lack of product 
standardisation made it impossible to create a single assembly line able to produce 
films in volume. Instead, sequential elements of film production had to be organised 
for each film. Effectively, when the studios wished to produce another unit of output 
they had to add another ‘assembly line’. As Staiger shows, the ‘director unit’ system 
enabled an increase from 1 film a week to 4 films, but only by multiplying the number 
of production units. Far from being used to produce huge numbers of films, these 
units often specialised in producing bespoke sequences (such as montages).  
 
     Finally we may quantify ‘mass’ production in the two contexts. Storper (1989:280) 
shows that Hollywood’s annual output reached a peak of 497 films in 1941 and has 
declined thereafter. He notes that in 1918 Universal’s studio produced 250 films – 
equal to the total output of the industry in 1989. By comparison, Dawson (2013:29) 
notes, in the early 1930s, Ford produced over 1 million ‘Model A’ cars per year. 
However the important point about mass production is its ability to deliver economies 
of scale. Hounshell (1984:224) shows that between 1909, its first year of production, 
and 1916 Ford was able to increase Model T output from 13,840 to 585,388, and 
thereby reduce the price from $950 to $360. Hollywood achieved no such reduction in 
cost per unit and, as I argue below, this reflects a key difference between the 
economics of media and manufacturing production. 
 
Alternative paradigms: flexible specialization and craft 
production 
 
Around the time of the publication of CHC, a new theory of capitalist production 
suggested that Taylorism, Fordism and mass production had been supplanted by 
another paradigmatic production system, variously described as ‘flexible 
specialization’ (Piore and Sabel, 1984) and post-Fordism (Murray, 1987). The theory 
suggested that, roughly since the late 1960s, mass consumer markets had become 
saturated, forcing manufacturers to abandon mass production of standardised 
products. New flexible production systems, based on the use of programmable 
manufacturing technologies (rather than assembly lines) and a variable mix of 
independent supplier firms (as opposed to vertically integrated corporations) enabled 
production of a constantly changing variety of products, often for niche markets.  
 
     Storper and Christopherson adopt Piore and Sabel’s thesis to explain the end of 
Hollywood’s mass production system. The studios, they argue, experienced a crisis 
‘typical of Fordist industries’ – a decline in consumption of their standardised 
products – precipitated by two ‘shocks’. The 1948 Paramount court verdict ended the 
‘assured market’ created by the studios’ control of cinema chains and the diffusion of 
television ownership brought competition from new content suppliers (Storper 1989: 
279). The studios’ revenues began to decline, this argument runs, because their mass 
production system was incapable of producing the product variety and innovation 
necessary to succeed in these newly competitive markets.  Because of their ‘curious 
form of standardisation of the film product… the integrated studios found, in their 
1950s and 1960s profit crises, that production bureaucracies were less effective at 
continuously revolutionizing the product than a disintegrated, externalized structure’. 
(Storper, 1993: 481).   
 
     Over a long period, he argues, the studios abandoned mass production of formulaic 
films and developed a flexible production system able to provide the innovation and 
variety required for blockbuster films (‘spectaculars’).  This involved the studios 
closing many of their own production facilities and working with a proliferation of 
small sub-contractors with specialist skills and technologies (like 3D). Mass 
production was no more; in place of repetitive, predictable tasks, production of 
blockbusters required ‘increasing skill specialization and flexibility’ (Christopherson 
and Storper 1989:341). 
 
     Unlike Staiger, Storper and Christopherson do not conduct a detailed analysis of 
film production techniques. Instead their theory of production is part of a broader 
theory about the role of production in the transition to the post-studio era.  Storper 
(1989) makes a convincing case that this transition was a response to a long-term 
decline in audiences and studio revenues. He shows that there was a fall in film 
output, a rise in the number of independent films produced and an increase in average 
film budgets. He also demonstrates that the fall in film output, the increase in budgets 
and the studios’ increasing use of independent producers and contractors was part of a 
decision to make qualitative changes in the type of films produced– the move to 
blockbuster movies.  
 
     It is the specific role of the production system in Storper and Christopherson’s 
argument which appears unsustainable. Storper (1989) argues that the fall in studio 
revenues resulted from the inability of formulaic Hollywood films to compete, once 
the studios lost control of the cinemas and with the emergence of TV. However, as 
Sedgwick (2002:679) and others have shown, the decline in movie audiences 
occurred before the ‘shocks’ of the 1948 Paramount judgment and the emergence of 
widespread TV ownership in the late 1950s. Studio revenues fell, not because their 
formulaic films were unable to compete with content from other providers, but as a 
result of the same post-war social trends which were causing mass markets in 
manufacturing to expand. As Americans were buying cars, homes full of consumer 
durables, and a range of domestic recreational goods and services, they were also 
abandoning cinemas: 
  
When middle-class Americans moved to the suburbs in record numbers after the 
Second World War, they also abandoned propinquity to the matrix of downtown and 
neighbourhood movie theatres. In addition these young adults, previously the most 
loyal fans, concentrated on raising families’ (Gomery, cited in Sedgwick (ibid). 
 
     The fall in studios’ revenues, rather than resulting from the inflexibility of their 
production system, was a consequence of these changes in consumer habits which 
decreased the total size of the market for films. Furthermore, this change could not be 
related to a crisis in the Fordist mode of production since, at the time, manufacturing 
was enjoying a post-war boom.  
 
     Below, I shall try to develop a theoretical explanation for changes and continuities 
in media production (including the Hollywood case) which is more convincing than 
mass production/flexible specialisation theories. First, however we must deal with 
another theory, also influential in PEC, that media production resisted Taylorism and 
mass production and remains a pre-industrial, craft. Garnham (1979:149) originally 
saw in media production ‘a pre-capitalist artisanal mode of economic organisation’. 
Banks (2010:309) argued that Ryan’s (1992) conceptualization of the craft workshop 
is the media industry standard. To explain the persistence of craft production, 
Garnham (1979:140) developed a theory of inherent barriers to industrialization of 
media production: 
 
‘Historically the sphere of mental production or non-material production presented 
and continues to present important barriers to this process and the forms and 
dynamics of the mass media can in part be understood as resulting from a continuous 
attempt to surmount those barriers and from the concretely various successes and 
failures of this attempt’.  
 
     Garnham (1979) proposed two potential barriers to industrialisation - labour 
resistance and the strategies of capital. While labour resistance, via media craft 
unions, clearly did limit management ability to rationalize production for many years 
(see Mosco and McKercher 2009) in conditions of extensive workforce casualization 
this seems unlikely to be a sufficient explanation.  Garnham (1979:149) argues that 
capitalists may retain artisanal production because it ‘ensures the necessary 
production of a range of heterogeneous cultural artefacts’. Ryan (1992: 108) suggests 
that capital’s ability to replace skilled, craft labour is contrained by social attitudes: 
‘art is conventionally held to be a product of the imagination and talents of 
identifiable individuals’. Testing this theory against the Hollywood case, we find 
production of a variety of films, in studio ‘factories’ with a degree of specialization 
and scale which sets them apart from Marx’s and Braverman’s accounts of craft 
production.  
 
Recently Garnham (2011:49) has shown how PEC has moved away from drawn on 
neo-classical economics to : 
  
‘Rather than attempting to deploy a very generalized theory of industrialization and 
commodification, (PEC) has needed to look at both specific markets and specific 
industry structures and dynamics as highly differentiated’ (ibid) 
 
     The next section follows this approach to drawing on media economics and 
organization theory to try to develop a more convincing theoretical explanation of the 
Hollywood production model, which might then be applied to other forms of media 
production. 
 
A new paradigm? Projects and markets  
 
Baumol  (2006) suggests that differences between media and manufacturing 
production result in the different economics of the two  industries. He argues that 
creative production is inherently impossible to standardise in the way Staiger 
suggests, citing the example of a choreographer:  
 
     ‘Unlike the production of automobiles or shoes, in which identical products can be 
turned out in apparently endless succession, the choreographer’s efforts (like the 
research and development division of a firm) must provide creations, each of which 
differs significantly from each and every one of the other products in the arena’ 
(2006:348). 
 
     Because creative organisations produce unique products – each is a ‘first copy’ 
(Shapiro and Varian 1998:20) – they have limited opportunities to achieve economies 
of scale. However, as Rosenberg (1963:220) shows, they may achieve economies of 
specialisation deriving ‘not from the production of a completely homogeneous 
product but from the concentration upon a relatively narrow (heterogeneous) product 
range, where each small production run differs only slightly from the others and 
where all outputs draw upon a homogeneous collection of resources’.  Rather than 
craft production, therefore, a growing literature suggests much media production is 
organized as a series of more-or-less similar projects (see De Fillippi et al. 2007 for a 
review). This theory suggests that media production is inherently flexible (and thus 
has not required a transition to flexible specialization) and should, over time, exhibit 
continuities and changes around the fundamental project model. As I shall argue 
below, however, this project model fails to capture differences in production which 
are specific to media cultural forms. 
 
     Secondly, media economics identifies the different economics of mass distribution 
for media firms. As we have seen, Ford achieved a mass market for the model T by 
rationalizing production and lowering unit costs and thus prices. By contrast, media 
firms can reach mass markets without lowering production costs. If Baumol’s 
choreographer’s performance was filmed (i.e. it became media production) then, 
compared to its ‘first copy’ costs, the costs of mass reproduction (as DVD or TV 
broadcast) would be negligible. Exceptional profits would be obtainable if it could be 
sold to a mass audience: ‘to achieve cost leadership by scale economies and 
experience, a tried and true competition strategy in various manufacturing contexts, is 
tame in comparison (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  So important is this factor, that 
Wasko and Aksoy and Robins’ argue that the key to PEC is distribution, not 
production. 
 
     While the project production model helps identify continuities over time, it does 
not explain change in production systems.  Here we may turn to another 
distinguishing feature of media economics – risk. The high first copy costs already 
noted make media production inherently risky. These risks are compounded by the 
exceptionally risky nature of most media product markets. Caves (2000) argues media 
product markets are distinguished by unusually high information uncertainty. Thus, 
although mass markets are relatively inexpensive to reach, these markets are also very 
uncertain. Our choreographer faces the problem that (contra Ryan and Banks) 
originality and authenticity are no guide to achieving mass sales. In practice,  ‘nobody 
knows’ what makes a successful media product (Caves, 2000:3). 
 
     Based on the argument thus far, we may hypothesize that, other things being equal, 
media producers will restrict product variety by producing recognizable, popular 
styles, genres, formats and franchises. Much media criticism since the Frankfurt 
School has evidenced this phenomenon (Adorno, 2001:100). However, rather than 
being driven by the economics of standardisation as in manufacturing (as the 
Frankfurt theorists suggested) this relative standardisation enables media firms first to 
realize economies of specialization and secondly to reduce the ‘nobody knows’ risk, 
by increasing the information available to consumers. Lorenzen (2009) shows how 
producers who reuse film brands, stars ‘but also writers, directors, producers, and 
sometimes also designers and some technical staff’ increase brand value, at the 
expense of variety in stories or aesthetics.  
 
     However the history of media formats and franchises demonstrates this strategy 
can only control risks to a degree: 
 
The prototype issue of a new magazine or the pilot program for a new TV series can 
be tested, but their results can only vaguely forecast the outcome of the launching of 
the new product…Once in the market, each new magazine issue and each new 
episode of a series is subject to creativity and innovation; each one is a new project’ 
(Reca, 2006:195).  
 
     Yet, unlike Ford, media producers’ project production system means they are not 
bound to a standardised product. An alternative product strategy is the ‘hit model’  
(practiced in R&D intensive organizations, see Gassmann and Reepmeyer, 2005) 
where firms accept that risky product markets make failures inevitable. Rather than 
trying to reduce risk, firms increase the scale and variety of their products in the hope 
one will be a ‘blockbuster’, achieving mass distribution and exceptional profits and 
more than recouping the costs of the failures. Despite its questionable efficacy, this 
continues to be the Hollywood studios’ modern strategy (see De Vany and Wallis, 
1999). 
 
     Our theory suggests that economies of specialization and strategy towards risky 
media product markets are key factors in explaining the nature of and changes in the 
project production systems of media firms. Translating this into the Hollywood case, 
we would hypothesize that, other things being equal the studios would maximize 
economies of specialization in project production and minimize product market risk 
by producing recognizable genres and styles. And this is what Lampel and Shamsie’s 
(2003) study suggests. Their conception of film production accords well with 
Rosenberg’s idea of specialization around ‘a homogeneous collection of resources’. 
They define the key skills of filmmaking not in terms of art or creativity, but as the 
transformation of a ‘loose bundle of resources’ (script, director, stars etc.) into a 
finished product. The key skills required are ‘evaluating talent’ ‘negotiating contracts’ 
and ‘recruiting and working with producers, writers, directors’. They show that in the 
studio era, Hollywood firms generally retained these key resources on long-term 
contracts and – once committed to these high, fixed costs – economies of scale could 
be achieved by vertical integration. This logic is consistent with Staiger’s and Storper 
and Christopherson’s finding of relative standardisation of the product via familiar 
genres and styles. 
 
     The theory would predict that studios would change the production system only 
when their product market strategies changed. As we have seen, post-war 
suburbanization reduced the size of the box office market for films. Downtown 
cinemas faced new competition, not from TV or independents, but from leisure 
activities in the suburbs. Producers like Twentieth Century Fox’s Daryl F. Zanuck led 
moves to a new product market strategy, aiming to reduce market risk by making a 
smaller number, of more expensive and more varied films in the hope of finding a 
blockbuster: 
 
‘Theatregoers are more selective than ever before.... This does not mean that every 
picture we make must be a freak attraction completely off the beaten path but it does 
mean that it must have at least an idea that will lift it out of the commonplace’ (cited 
in Sedgwick, 2002) 
 
     This change in strategy both increased ‘first copy’ costs and removed the 
opportunity for economies of specialization by reusing the resource bundle. This in 
turn undermined the logic of maintaining the high, fixed costs of long-term contracts 
with creative labour and so studios began to acquire resource bundles on a project-by-
project basis.  As Lampel and Shamsie show, this undermined the economies 
achievable through vertical integration and so it was logical to reduce other fixed 
costs (sound stages, post-production etc.) through ‘outsourcing’.   
 
     However Lampel and Shamsie’s (2003:2205) study suggests that these changes did 
not require a fundamental change to the project model of production: ‘the craft of 
movie making today is not fundamentally different than it was during the studio era’. 
Filmmaking, they say, never involved an ‘assembly line’ but has always been ‘not 
strictly sequential but iterative… (and) tightly interdependent’ (2003:2194). They 
conclude that, from the beginning of the studio era, the studios were well aware 
(despite wish to show the parallels with Ford) that they were operating project 
production: 
 
‘When the Hollywood movie industry achieved maturity in the 1920s, the focus 
shifted to the feature film… The shift coincided with the recognition in Hollywood 
that movie making is intrinsically a project-based enterprise’ (ibid). 
 
     This theory of a fundamentally unchanging project method of film production, 
altered by changes in strategies towards product market risk appears to provide a 
better explanation of the Hollywood case than the theory of mass production/flexible 
specialization. However this conception of ‘project’ production provides an 
explanation only at an abstract level.  To provide a genuine alternative to Staiger’s 
detailed account of the division of labour in film production requires a theory which 
can articulate the relationships between market risk, project production and the 
division of labour and thus provide a more convincing explanation than theories 
founded on Taylorism (succeeded by flexibly specialisation) or craft control of 
production. Organization theory suggests that project and matrix organizations pose a 
fundamental challenge to Taylorism, by creating two competing sources of authority 
–specialist departments and project managers (Mintzberg, 1979:170).  The theory 
suggests that in conventional matrix organizations, project managers resolve this 
dilemma by controlling conception and leaving detailed execution to the specialists.   
 
     Lampel (2001:46) suggests that the studios developed the ‘central producer’ 
system as a variation of this approach. Rather than a separation of conception and 
execution, the central producer was deeply involved ‘in the conceptualization and 
detail of the project…. bringing top management downward into the process’. 
Hesmondhalgh (2002:50) follows Ryan (1992) in suggesting that a similar role –a 
‘creative manager’ closely involved in the work of a project team of relatively 
autonomous specialists – is typical of media production. And Hesmondhalgh 
(2006:227) notes, this idea has similarities to Bourdieu’s (1986) idea of cultural 
intermediaries.   
 
     We can thus begin to show the relationship between product markets, media firm 
strategies, project production and the division of labour. Our theory would 
hypothesize that, as project production, media production also poses a challenge to 
Taylorist management methods by creating two competing sources of authority – on 
the one hand the particular strategies for managing product market uncertainty and on 
the other the creative autonomy required for media specialists to produce products 
capable of attracting a mass audience. Rather than a Taylorist division of labour, 
therefore, we would expect creative managers to play a key role in resolving this 
dilemma on a daily basis. 
 
     Drawing on media economics and organization theory thus provides a more 
convincing explanation of the Hollywood case than the mass production/flexible 
specialization paradigm.  But to provide an explanation at the level of detail in 
Staiger’s account requires attention to the cultural as well as the market and 
organizational characteristics of media production. Mintzberg and McHugh’s 
(1985:192) study of the Canadian National Film Board provides a good example of 
this problem: 
 
The dilemma of leadership in managing adhocracy lies in trying to exercise influence 
without being able to rely on formal controls. NFB managers had their hands on some 
levers of decision, such as staffing levels and the design of the structure itself, but not 
on others, notably the content of specific films. Trying to manage in this situation is a 
little like trying to drive an automobile without controlling the steering wheel. You 
can accelerate and brake, but not determine direction.  
 
     Mintzberg and McHugh are able to identify the importance of the ‘creative 
manager’ but they cannot explain how such managers resolve the dilemmas presented 
by media production. Such analyses produce in reverse the problem Mosco identified 
with theories focused on creativity – the focus on complex processes obscures the role 
of creativity and culture. This is also a failing of ‘production of culture’ approaches 
(see Peterson, 1976).  As noted above, the project model captures the similarities 
between film, TV, print and game production at the expense of the differences. To an 
extent ‘project’ has replaced mass production/flexible specialization as the paradigm 
of media production. The next section makes a first step in developing a theory 
capable of explaining the differences between media production systems by 
attempting to identify the relationships between media markets, project organization, 
creative management and specific media styles and genres. Space prevents more than 
an outline of these relationships, which will be the subject of a future article. 
 
Media specific theories of production 
 
Attention to cultural influences on production raises the question of whether political 
economy alone can provide the basis for a theory of media production. The strength 
of PEC has been its ability to enlighten by comparing the media to other industries. 
However this has been achieved at the expense of an ability to understand and explain 
the role of creativity and culture in media production. This would suggest that 
Murdock and Golding’s (1973) conception of PEC is unduly limiting. A theory of 
media production needs to depart from the assumption that the media should be 
analysed, ‘first and foremost’, as industrial and commercial organisations.   
 
     Many writers, especially Kellner (e.g. 2002), have argued that this problem should 
be addressed by a theoretical reconciliation, and integration, of PEC and cultural 
studies. However an attempt to incorporate the cultural influences on production 
would suggest that there can be no general theory (or paradigm) of media production, 
since these cultural influences are media specific. Instead the theory would show the 
relationships between more common economic and organizational variables (product 
market risk, dilemmas of project production, creative managers) and culturally 
specific aspects of producing particular media content. Miege’s (1987:274) approach 
proposed that ‘social logics’ generated five types of media production. Although he 
(Miege, 2011) recognized problems with these ideal types, Altheide and Snow 
(1994:4) provide an alternative conception, connecting media logics to the concepts 
of format, genre and style: 
 
‘Media logic refers to the assumptions and processes for constructing messages within 
a particular medium. This includes rhythm, grammar, and format. Format, while a 
feature of media logic, is singularly important because it refers to the rules or ‘codes’ 
for defining, selecting, organising, presenting, and recognizing information as one 
thing rather than another (e.g., ‘the evening news’ and not a ‘situation comedy,’ or a 
‘parody of news’)  
 
     Tracing the articulation of cultural variables with project production and 
economies of specialization enables analysis of the specific economics of media 
content genres (see also Dwyer, 2015). For example, Doyle (2002) has shown how 
‘first copy’ costs vary significantly both between genres of TV (from expensive 
drama to low cost chat shows) and within genres (single dramas to serials and series).  
This suggests that the economies of specialisation achievable by project production 
are influenced by the conventions of genre, style and format. Thus: ‘notwithstanding 
the spread of digital technologies, the skills, techniques and equipment involved in 
newspaper production and distribution are, in fact, generally still quite different from 
those required in the television industry, and vice versa’ (Doyle, 2002:32). As an 
alternative to rationalising production, media firms, such as broadcasters, may change 
their product market strategies choosing between a broad range of content genres: ‘for 
broadcasters, reducing costs involves replacing expensive genres with less expensive 
ones’ (Magder, 2004:143). 
 
     Theorizing the relationship between cultural variables and the division of labour, 
between creative managers and other production workers, requires particular care. 
There is a tendency to return to Staiger, Storper and Christopherson’s approach, 
suggesting that genres, formats and styles act (like continuity scripts) as Fordist 
blueprints, enabling detailed control of execution. For example, Ryan (1992:150) 
argues that media formats mean: ‘creative work is performed to a management plan. 
Specific, fixed cultural rules are formulated as company policy by its creative 
managers and applied to members of the project team’. Kellner (2002:47) (amongst 
others) suggests that ‘production bibles’ also enable Taylorist management of 
production:  
 
‘Within the genre, each series has its own codes and formats which are followed 
according to the dictates of the production company; each series, for instance, uses a 
manual (or 'story bible') that tells writers and production teams what to do and not to 
do, defines characters and plot lines, and the conventions of the series; continuity 
experts enforce the following of these codes rigorously’. 
 
     Our analysis of the Hollywood case has illustrated the limits to Taylorism in media 
production. As Garnham (2011:48) notes: ‘while capitalist owners and managers 
might want to control production, they (have) few tools for so doing’.  A more 
convincing articulation of the role of creative managers in the division of labour is 
suggested by post-Braverman theories of the labour process. Knights and McCabe 
(1999: 203), for example, have argued for a conception of authority which reflects the 
‘plurality of disciplinary mechanisms, techniques of surveillance and power 
knowledge strategies’ In this respect, as indicated at the start of this article, some 
sections of CHC still provide a good example of an attempt to an integrate theories of 
film style and production. Analysing trade documents and the films themselves, 
Bordwell et al. (1985:88) explain the emergence of the Hollywood style and its 
production system as a product of ‘specifiable discourses discussing, describing, and 
validating these practices’. Mittel (2005) adapted Bordwell’s ‘historical poetics’ to 
analyse TV genres. Empirical ethnographic studies (for example, Dornfield, 1998) 
offer an alternative to the historical method, but tend to provide ‘thick description’, 
rather than a theoretical explanation, of the ways media producers and managers 
exercise autonomy and supervision in media production. 
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